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Notes
State Action and the Peremptory Challenge:
Evolution of the Court's Treatment and
Implications for Georgia v. McCollum
I. INTRODUCTION
As a part of our common law heritage, "[t]he peremptory
challenge has very old credentials."' Beginning in the early 1960s,
however, the peremptory challenge was attacked on the grounds
that litigants used it to exclude blacks from juries, thereby perpet-
uating racial discrimination in the courtroom. Legal attacks on the
peremptory challenge culminated in a series of Supreme Court
cases. In these cases, the Court addressed claims that the discrimi-
natory2 use of peremptory challenges by the prosecution in a
1 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 212 (1965) ovemuled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476.
U.S. 79 (1986). During jury selection, two types of challenges are used. The first, chal-
lenges for cause, allow a party to remove a person from the venire upon showing that
he or she will be unable to fairly decide the case for some articuable reason. The parties
have an unlimited number of challenges for cause. The second type, peremptory chal-
lenges, have traditionally allowed a party to remove a person from the venire without
stating a reason. Generally, parties have a limited number of peremptory challenges.
The peremptory challenge was first used in early England, where the crown had an
unlimited number and could virtually "hand-pick" juries. JON M. VAN DYKE, JURY SELEC-
TnON PROCEDURES 147 (1977) (footnote omitted). In 1305, however, this practice was
abolished by a statute "that limited the crown to challenges for 'cause certain' and elimi-
nated completely the right of the king's attorney to exercise peremptory challenges.
Criminal defendants were, however, still allowed to challenge jurors peremptorily." Id.
The 1305 statute was incorporated into the common law by the first American
courts, although the prosecution was eventually allowed peremptory challenges as well. Id.
at 148. In 1790, Congress codified the right of criminal defendants to use peremptory
challenges in trials for treason and capital cases. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1
Stat. 119. While there was some debate as to the prosecution's right to exercise peremp-
tory challenges, "[b]y the beginning of the twentieth century, the government's right ...
was firmly established." VAN DYKE, supra, at 150. In 1872, Congress codified the civil
party's right to peremptory challenges. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 332, 17 Stat. 282.
Today, the right of parties to use peremptory challenges in federal court is gov-
erned by FED. R. CtV. P. 47(b) and FED. R. CuM. P. 24(b). For additional information
on peremptory challenges, see JAMES J. GOBERT & WALTER E. JORDAN, JURY SELEGrION ch.
8 (2d ed. 1990).
2 Any exercise of a peremptory challenge is "discriminatory" in that it allows the
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criminal case' and by private parties in a civil case4 violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Part II
of this Note reviews these cases. Part III discusses the facts and
procedural history of Georgia v. McCiollum,6 in which the Supreme
Court will decide the remaining question in this area of the law:
whether the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by a
criminal defendant violates the Equal Protection Clause.7 Part IIIA
outlines the framework under which the Court should decide
McCollum, applies the analysis to its facts, and concludes that the
discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by a criminal defen-
dant violates the Equal Protection Clause. Part IIIB examines the
possible effects such a holding would have on the rights of a crim-
inal defendant.
party exercising it to choose between the juror removed and the ones eventually seated.
For purposes of this Note, however, the term "discriminatory use of peremptoy challeng-
es" means exercising those challenges on the basis of race.
3 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965) ovemued by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986).
4 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
5 "No State shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause applies equal protection principles to the federal government. Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
Another case in this line is Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990), in which the
Court considered a claim by a white man that the prosecution's discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges violated his Sixth Amendment right to trial by an impartial jury.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. (The Sixth Amendment right
to a jury trial in criminal cases is applicable to the states through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).)
Although the defendant had standing to bring the claim, Holland, 110 S. Ct at 805-06,
the Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a fair cross section of the commu-
nity on the venire, not on the petit jury. Accordingly, the discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges does not violate the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 807-09. The Court did not
address the issue of whether the defendant would have standing to bring an equal pro-
tection challenge, or whether such a claim would be successful. Id. at 811.
6 State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688 (Ga.), crrt. granted, 112 S. Ct. 370 (1991).
7 This issue has received some attention in lower courts. Several states have held
that a criminal defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violates their
state constitution. See, eg, People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748 (Cal. 1978); State v. Neil,
457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845 (Haw. 1990); Commonwealth
v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499 (Mass. 1979), cert. denid 444 U.S. 881 (1979); State v.
Alvarado, 534 A.2d 440 (NJ. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1987); People v. Kern, 555 N.Y.S.2d 647
(N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 77 (1990).
In addition, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that a criminal
defendant's gender-based use of peremptory challenges violates the Fifth Amendment
United States v. DeGross, No. 87-5226, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 5645 (9th Cir. April 2,
1992) (en banc). DeGross is discussed infra note 123.
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II. DISCRIMINATORY USE OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES: JUDICIAL EVOLUTION
A. Prosecutorial Misuse of Peremptoies
The Supreme Court first addressed the discriminatory use of
peremptory challenges in Swain v. Alabama.' In Swain, an all-white
jury convicted a black man of rape and sentenced him to death.
During the jury selection process, the prosecutor used his peremp-
tory challenges to strike all six blacks on the venire. The defense
objected to these strikes, claiming that the prosecution's strikes
were racially-motivated and that such a use of peremptory chal-
lenges violated the Equal Protection Clause.9 The objections were
overruled, and the Alabama Supreme Court subsequently af-
firmed.'0
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
defendant's conviction." The Court outlined stringent require-
ments for proving that a prosecutor's use of peremptory challeng-
es violated the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that it
must be presumed that a prosecutor's purpose in using perempto-
8 380 U.S. 202 (1965) overruled ly Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
9 Id. at 203. The defendant's objections were based on the rule enunciated in
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). In Strauder, the defendant, a black man,
was indicted for murder. Prior to trial, the defendant made a motion to have the case
removed to federal court because West Virginia law did not allow blacks to serve on a
jury. The defendant contended that "he could not have the full and equal benefit of all
laws and proceedings in the State of West Virginia ... ." I& at 304. The trial court
denied the defendant's motion. The defendant was later convicted and the West Virginia
Supreme Court affirmed. Id.
In its consideration of the case, the United States Supreme Court noted that the
issue was not whether a person has a right to a jury composed in whole or in part of
persons of the same color, but rather whether persons of the defendant's "race or color
may be excluded by law [from serving as jurors], solely because of their race or col-
or . . . ." Id. at 305. The Court noted that the Fourteenth Amendment was framed to
protect blacks and to assure them "the enjoyment of all the civil rights that under the
law are enjoyed by white persons ... ." Id. at 306. The Court held that the West Virgin-
ia statute violated the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment, asking:
[H]ow can it be maintained that compelling a colored man to submit to a trial
for his life by a jury drawn from a panel from which the State has expressly ex-
cluded every man of his race, because of color alone, however well qualified in
other respects, is not a denial to him of equal legal protection?
Id. at 309.
10 156 So. 2d 368 (Ala. 1963).
11 Swain, 380 U.S. at 222.
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ry challenges is to seat a "fair and impartial jury." 2 In order to
rebut this presumption, a defendant would have to "show the
prosecutor's systematic use of peremptory challenges against Ne-
groes over a period of time."" The Court refused to find that
"the striking of Negroes in a particular case is a denial of equal
protection of the laws," since this would have worked "a radical
change in the nature and operation of the [peremptory] chal-
lenge. "14
Immediate reaction to Swain was negative. One commentator
noted that "it may prove virtually impossible for a defendant to
make the required showing of discrimination even if the prosecu-
tion has in fact consistently abused its right of peremptory chal-
lenge."" Another stated that the Court had "for the time being
effectively isolated from judicial review a device susceptible of
extraordinarily efficient use... to perpetuate the all-white ju-
ry.-"
6
Indeed, the Swain rule of "systematic exclusion" proved to be
of little help in eliminating prosecutors' discriminatory use of pe-
remptory challenges. Given the nearly impossible prima facie show-
ing required to prove discrimination, prosecutors were virtually
immune from inquiry into their motives for exercising peremptory
challenges.'
7
This situation remained unchanged until 1986 when the Su-
preme Court overruled Swain's evidentiary requirement and con-
siderably lessened the defendant's burden in making a prima facie
showing of purposeful discrimination by a prosecutor through the
12 Id.
13 Id. at 227. It was immediately clear that this would be an extremely difficult stan-
dard to meet. The Swain Court held that the record was insufficient to make out a pri-
ma facie case, even though it was shown that no black person had served on a petit jury
since 1950 in the county where the trial took place. Id. at 205.
14 Id. at 221-22. The Court conducted an extensive review of the history of peremp-
tory challenges, -explaining that they are deeply rooted in our legal system and necessary
to the elimination of bias in juries. Id. at 212-19.
15 Paul J. Mishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964 Tem-Foreword: The High Court, The Great
Wit, and the Due Process of Time and Law, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 137 (1965).
16 Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Bluerint for Perpetuation of the All-
White Jury, 52 VA. L REv. 1157, 1174-75 (1966). Several other commentators criticized the
Court's holding in Swain. See, e.g., Roger S. Kuhn, Juy Discrimination." The Next Phase, 41
S. CAL. L. REV. 235 (1967); John A. Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases. 77
Negro Defendant and His Peerless Jury, 4 HOUS. L. REv. 448 (1966); Comment, Fair Jury
Selection Procedures, 75 YALE L.J. 322 (1965).
17 One commentator noted that after Swain, "[in]ost courts . . .accepted the princi-
ple that we cannot inquire into the motives of any peremptory challenge exercised by
the prosecutor." VAN DYKE, supra note 1, at 166.
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use of peremptory challenges. In Batson v. Kentucky,18 the defen-
dant, a black man, was indicted for second degree burglary and
receipt of stolen goods. During jury selection, the prosecutor used
his peremptory challenges to strike the only four black persons on
the venire. The defendant moved to discharge the jury, arguing
that the prosecutor's actions violated his Sixth Amendment right
to a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the community and
his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the
laws. 9 The trial judge denied these motions, noting that the par-
ties were entitled to "strike anybody they want to" and that "the
cross-section requirement applies only to selection of the venire
and not to selection of the petit jury itself."20 The defendant was
convicted on both counts. Relying on Swain, the Supreme Court
of Kentucky affirmed.21
Outlining a new standard for reviewing the alleged discrimina-
tory use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor, the United
States Supreme Court reversed.' The Court rejected the Swain
standard of systematic exclusion because it had "placed on defen-
dants a crippling burden of proof .... " The Court noted that
new standards had evolved since Swain, necessitating this reevalua-
tion; recent decisions had recognized that systematic discrimina-
tion need not be shown to prove an equal 'protection violation.24
18 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
19 Id. at 83. Although the defendant asserted his own rights, the Court later noted
in its holding that the rights of the excluded juror were also implicated:
Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused
whose life or liberty they are summoned to try. Competence to serve as a juror
ultimately depends on an assessment of individual qualifications and ability im-
partially to consider evidence presented at trial .... As long ago as Strauder,
therefore, the Court recognized that by denying a person participation in jury
service on account of his race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated against
the excluded juror.
Id. at 87 (citations omitted).
20 Id. at 83.
21 Id. at 83-84.
22 The Court agreed with the State that the defendant's claim turned on equal
protection grounds. The Court believed that defendant's Sixth Amendment argument was
an attempt to avoid the Swain holding and, therefore, did not reach the Sixth Amend-
ment issue. Id. at 84-85 n.4.
23 Id. at 92.
24 Id. at 93. See, e-g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (Discriminatory
impact of District of Columbia employment test for police officers is not sufficient to
establish a Fifth Amendment violation; discriminatory intent must also be shown. Howev-
er, "[i]t is also not infrequently true that the discriminatory impact-in the jury cases for
example, the total or seriously disproportionate exclusion of Negroes from jury veni-
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As a result, the Batson Court held that a defendant could rely
solely on the facts of his case to make a prima facie showing of
purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor in the selection of the
petit jury.25
The Court established a three-prong test for defendants seek-
ing to make a prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in
the selection of the jury. First, the defendant must "show that he
is a member of a cognizable racial group2 6... and that the
prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from
the venire members of the defendant's race."27 Second, the de-
fendant "may rely on the fact ... that peremptory challenges
constitute a jury selection practice that permits 'those to discrimi-
nate who are of a mind to discriminate.'" 28 Finally, the Court
stated that a "defendant must show that these facts and any other
relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used
that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on
account of their race." The Court did not specify the quantum
of proof necessary to make the requisite showing. Instead, much
discretion was left to trial judges, who the Court felt were experi-
enced in voir dire procedures and capable of making these deter-
minations.'
The Court further held that once a defendant makes a prima
facie showing, the burden shifts to the prosecutor "to come for-
res-may for all practical purposes demonstrate unconstitutionality because in various
circumstances the discrimination is very difficult to explain on nonracial grounds."); Alex-
ander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972) (petitioner made out a prima facie case of racial
discrimination based on the selection of the grand jury that indicted him.).
25 Badton, 476 U.S. at 95-96.
26 Because virtually everyone belongs to a readily identifiable racial group, the first
half of this prong apparently required that the defendant belong to a racial group that
has historically been discriminated against. See GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 1, at 285.
27 Id. This two-part prong has apparently been eliminated. In Holland v. Illinois, 110
S. Ct. 803 (1990), the Court held that a white criminal defendant had standing to bring
a Sixth Amendment challenge to the exclusion of blacks from the jury. See supra note 5.
In Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991), the Court extended Holland to challenges un-
der the Equal Protection Clause. See infra note 57. Thus, Batson's holding is not limited
to defendants from particular racial groups objecting to the exclusion of potential jurors
of their race.
28 Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (quoting Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953)).
29 Id. The Court stated that the trial court should 'consider all relevant circumstanc-
es" when deciding whether a defendant has made a prima facie showing of purposeful
discrimination. Examples noted by the Court included "a 'pattern' of strikes against black
jurors included in the particular venire" and "questions and statements" of the prosecutor
made during voir dire. Id. at 96-97.
30 Id. at 97.
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ward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. "sl
The Supreme Court gave little guidance as to the exact nature of
the explanation the prosecutor would need to give in order to
rebut the prima facie showing. The Court held that while the
explanation need not "rise to the level" of one justifying a chal-
lenge for cause, it would not be enough for the prosecutor to rely
on the assumption that the juror "would be partial to the defen-
dant because of their shared race." 2 The Court also stated that a
mere denial of discriminatory purpose or an assertion of good
faith would not serve as a suitable explanation.s
B. Misuse of Peremptories in Civil Trials
After Batson, it was inevitable that the courts would face the
question of whether a civil litigant's discriminatory use of peremp-
tory challenges in a civil trial implicated the Fourteenth
Amendment. When this question eventually' reached the federal
appellate courts, no consensus of opinion emerged." The main
point of contention among the circuits was whether state action
was present, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment."5
The Supreme Court resolved this question in Edmonson v.
Leesville Concrete Co.' In Edmonson, a black construction worker
brought a negligence action against the defendant construction
company for injuries he sustained while at work. 7 During the
jury selection process, the defendant used its peremptory challeng-
es to strike two of the three black persons on the venire. Invoking
Batson, the plaintiff asked that the trial court require the defen-
31 Id.
32 I& For a discussion of explanations that have been accepted and denied as racial-
ly neutral reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge, see Steven M. Puiszis,
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.: Will the Peremptoy Challenge Surive its Battle with the
Equal Protection Clause?, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 37, 58-69 (1991).
33 Id. at 98. For a discussion of how the lower courts have dealt with a prosecutor's
rebuttal of a prima facie case under Batson, see GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 1, § 8.07;
Puiszis, supra note 32, at 69-72.
34 See Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 919 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1990)
(Batson holding' applies to private litigants in civil cases), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2797
(1991); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc)
(Batson holding does not restrict private parties' use of peremptory challenges in civil
trial), re'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991); Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822 (lth Cir. 1989)
(Batson applies in civil trial context), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 201 (1989).
35 Unlike a criminal trial such as Batson, where the prosecutor is clearly a state
actor, a civil trial presented a much more complicated state action question.
36 111 S.Ct. 2077 (1991).
37 Id. at 2080-81.
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dant to provide a neutral explanation for its use of the challeng-
es.m The court denied the plaintiff's request, ruling that Batson
only applied to criminal cases. At trial, a jury composed of eleven
whites and one black returned a verdict for the plaintiff. He was
awarded $90,000 in damages, but this was reduced to $18,000
because the jury found that he had been contributorily negli-
gent.3 9
A panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed.40 The panel held that
state action existed because peremptory challenges are a statutorily
created right and because the court's significant "oversight and
administration" of the jury selection process was sufficient to
"trigger state action" under Supreme Court precedent.41 The
court found that Batson's underlying policy was not limited to
curing discrimination in criminal proceedings.4 2
On rehearing en banc, the Fifth Circuit overturned the panel's
decision, finding that Batson did not apply to civil trials.4' Follow-
ing the two-step analysis of Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.," the court
38 Id. at 2081. As noted above, the Batson Court did not clearly indicate whose
equal protection rights were violated, but explained that the rights of both the defendant
and excluded juror were affected. See supra note 19. Edmonson, however, clearly addressed
itself to the rights of the excluded jurors.
39 I&
40 860 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1988).
41 Id. at 1312.
42 Id. at 1313.
43 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
44 457 U.S. 922 (1982). The Court's analysis of the state action question in Lugar
represents a synthesis of its prior state action jurisprudence. Lugar was the lessee-operator
of a truckstop, and Edmonson was one of his suppliers. Edmonson sued on a debt owed
by Lugar. Under a Virginia statute, Edmonson was able to obtain a prejudgment attach-
ment of Lugar's property by alleging in an ex partte proceeding that he believed that
Lugar was disposing of or might dispose of his property. Edmonson obtained a writ of
attachment, which was executed by the sheriff. The attachment was later dismissed for
failure to establish the appropriate statutory grounds. Id. at 924-25. Lugar sued Edmonson
and its president under § 1983, alleging deprivation of property without due process of
law. The district court held that there was no state action; therefore, the complaint did
not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 upon which relief could be granted. The
Fourth Circuit, sitting en ban4 affirmed. It held
that a private party acts under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983
only when there is a usurpation or corruption of official .power by the private
litigant or a surrender of judicial power to the private litigant in such a way
that the independence of the enforcing officer has been compromised to a
significant degree.
Id. at 926. Finding none of these elements in the case, the Fourth Circuit concluded
that the complaint did not state a cause of action under § 1983. The court also found
the Supreme Court's cases dealing with state action inapplicable because the issue was
whether there was action under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983. Id. at
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concluded that no state actor was present. The court rejected the
argument that the trial judge was a state actor, characterizing his
role in the exercise of peremptory challenges as "ministerial."'
The court also held that the private attorney was not a state ac-
tor.' Thus, finding no state actor, the court held that the Equal
Protection Clause was not implicated.4
7
928.
On appeal, the Supreme Court first rejected the Fourth Circuit's determination that
conduct which would be state action under the Fourteenth Amendment is not necessarily
action under color of state law for purposes of §1983. On the contrary, the Court held
that conduct sufficient to establish state action also established action under color of
state law. Id. at 935. The Court then addressed the proper standard for determining
whether or not state action exists. The Court stated that the proper inquiry is whether
"the conduct allegedly causing the deprivation of a federal right [is] fairly attributable to
the State." Id. at 937. This inquiry has two parts:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege
created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a per-
son for whom the State is responsible .... Second, the party charged with the
deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This
may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has
obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise
chargeable to the State.
Id. The Court noted that these two inquiries merge when the actor's official character
gives the weight of the state to his decision; they diverge when the actor is a private
party. Id.
Applying the standard to Lugar's case, the Court found that Edmonson Oil
Company's use of a state created procedure, the writ of attachment, satisfied the first
prong of the test. Id. at 941. Edmonson's use of the sheriff constituted joint action with
a state official, satisfying the second prong. Id. Accordingly, Lugar was deprived of his
property through state action, and, therefore, under color of state law. I& at 942.
45 Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 221. The court was also concerned that characterizing the
trial judge as a state actor in such a situation would serve to constitutionalize "every as-
pect" of civil trials. Id. at 222.
46 Id. The court relied on Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981), in which
the Supreme Court held that a public defender does not act under color of state law
when performing the traditional functions of counsel in a criminal trial. Polk County is
discussed infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
47 Edmonson, 895 F.2d at 222. The court also examined "a few underlying consider-
ations of logic and policy" that supported its holding. The court noted the importance of
the peremptory challenge in assuring a fair trial and stated that courts should be hesitant
to tamper with it unless Batson so mandates. Id. at 222-23. The court further explained
that neither Batson's authority nor its reasoning required that it be extended to civil
trials. The court focused on the "greatly different" contexts of criminal and civil proceed-
ings. Id. at 223-26. With these differences in mind, the court refused to extend Batson
into the civil area, "where the considerations on which Batson is based are, if present at
all, far weaker than in the criminal field." Id. at 226.
Underlying the Fifth Circuit's opinion seems to be a fundamental disagreement with
the Supreme Court over whether any real discrimination is involved when an attorney
strikes black veniremen because he believes they may be inclined to favor an individual
of their own race. Id at 224-25. Nonetheless, the court conceded that because of the
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The Supreme Court reversed. Writing for the majority, Justice
Kennedy found state action under the two-prong test of Lugar v.
Edmonson Oil C0.41 In addressing Lugar's first prong-whether the
constitutional deprivation was caused by the exercise of a State-
created right or privilege-the Court found that the peremptory
challenge clearly meets this requirement because it is a statutory
device, created by the State.49
The majority of the Court's analysis was devoted to Lugar's
second prong, which requires that "the party charged with the
deprivation must fairly be said to be a state actor." 0 In its analy-
sis, the Court noted that the government's significant involvement
in the jury selection process made it possible for private parties to
exercise peremptory challenges." The Court explained that
[t] he government summons jurors, constrains their freedom of
movement, and subjects them to public scrutiny and examina-
tion. The party who exercises a challenge invokes the formal
authority of the court, which must discharge the prospective
juror, thus effecting the "final and practical denial" of the ex-
cluded individual's opportunity to serve on the petit jury.52
The Court further found that the peremptory challenge is a
tool used for choosing the jury, "a quintessential government
body, having no attributes of a private actor."" The Court ex-
plained that the jury performs duties that are government func-
tions, including fact-finding, weighing evidence, assessing the
credibility of witnesses, and delivering a verdict. 4
Finally, the Court noted that the government's participation
in the jury selection process serves to aggravate the injury of dis-
crimination:
greater degree of state involvement in criminal proceedings and the likelihood of higher
stakes in a criminal trial, it was understandable that the Supreme Court would strike the
balance in favor of eliminating the "actuality or even the appearance of racially motivated
strikes" as opposed to preserving the "'any reason or no reason' rule for peremptory
challenges" in the criminal context. Id. at 225.
48 See supra note 44.
49 Edmomn, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
50 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
51 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2084. The Court noted that, in the federal system, Con-
gress has statutorily provided for the qualifications of jurors as well as the procedure for
their selection. In addition, the court's officers summon and assemble the jurors, and the
trial judge oversees the selection process, including voir dire, challenges for cause, pe-
remptory challenges, and the actual dismissal of jurors. Id.
52 Id. at 2085 (quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322 (1880)).
53 Id.
54 Id.
[Vol. 67:1049
1992] NOTE-PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES AND CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS 1059
Race discrimination within the courtroom raises serious
questions as to the fairness of the proceedings conducted
there. Racial bias mars the integrity of the judicial system and
prevents the idea of democratic government from becoming a
reality .... To permit racial exclusion in this official forum
compounds the racial insult inherent in judging a citizen by
the color of his or her skin.
55
As a result of these considerations, the Court found that Lugas
second prong was satisfied, and therefore, the discriminatory use
of peremptory challenges in a civil trial violates a potential juror's
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection rights.56
The final issue the Court considered was whether a private
litigant could assert the Fourteenth Amendment rights of an ex-
cluded juror. Relying on its recent decision in Powers v. Ohio,5 7
the Court held that a private litigant could.assert the rights of the
excluded juror." While an individual usually cannot assert the
rights of a third party, the Court explained that third-party stand-
ing does exist when a "litigant can demonstrate that he or she has
suffered a concrete, redressable injury, that he or she has a close
relation with the third party, and that there exists some hindrance
to the third party's ability to protect his or her own interests."59
The Court held that its conclusion in Powers that a party in a
criminal trial satisfied these requirements and could seek to pro-
tect the rights of an excluded juror was also applicable to a civil
trial. °
55 Id. at 2087.
56 Id.
57 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991). In Powers, a white man accused of murder made a Batson
objection to the prosecutor's removal of seven black venirepersons through the use of
peremptory challenges. Id. 'at 1366. The Ohio Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme
Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, finding no constitutional violation. Id. at 1366-
67. The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that "the Equal
Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using the State's peremptory challenges to
exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from the petit jury solely by reason of
their race ... ." I at 1370. Such a use of peremptory challenges violates the excluded
juror's Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. The Court went on to hold that the criminal
defendant could assert the excluded juror's equal protection rights under principles of
third-party standing. Id. at 1370-73. See infra text accompanying note 59. Finally, the
Court held that it was irrelevant that the defendant's race differed from that of the juror
since "the utility of the peremptory challenge system must be accommodated to the com-
mand of racial neutrality." Id. at 1373.
58 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2087-88.
59 Id. at 2087.
60 Id.
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The Court remanded the case so that the trial court could
determine whether the plaintiff had established a prima facie case
of racial discrimination. In making this determination, the Court
explained, the trial court should follow the framework set out in
Batson.
6
'
III. PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES, CRIMINAL DEFENSE DEFENDANTS,
AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE:
GEORGIA V. MCCOLLUM
Although Batson and Edmonson have done much to eliminate
jury selection based on race, one question remains unanswered:
whether criminal defendants can use peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory manner. The Supreme Court will resolve the issue
this term, in Georgia v. McCollum.6"
In McCollum, the defendant was indicted after an alterca-
tion.' The state filed a motion seeking to prevent the defendant
from exercising peremptory challenges in a' discriminatory manner.
The trial court denied the motion.' On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court, noting that Edmonson
was a civil trial, and thus did not apply here.' In a rather short
opinion, the court explained:
While it may be that the United States Supreme Court may, in
another case, prohibit a criminal defendant from exercising
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors on the basis of race, it
has not yet done so. Bearing in mind the long history of jury
trials as an essential element of the protection of human rights,
this court declines to diminish the free exercise of peremptory
strikes by a criminal defendant.66
61 Id. at 2088-89. The Batson framework is discussed supra notes 26-33 and accompa-
nying text.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, dissented.
Justice O'Connor's dissent is discussed infra at note 84 and notes 117-22 and accompany-
ing text.
Justice Scalia also wrote a separate dissenting opinion describing what he saw as the
unfortunate results of the Court's holding. He claimed that peremptory challenges can be
used "to assure rather than to prevent a racially diverse jury." Id. at 2095. Justice Scalia
also claimed that the majority's decision would logically have to apply to criminal defen-
dants. Accordingly, a minority defendant would not be able to use peremptory challenges
to avoid an all-white jury. Additionally, the Court's holding would result in more time be-
ing devoted "to sideshows and less and less to the merits of the case." Id. at 2096.
62 State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688 (Ga.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 370 (1991).
63 Id. at 689.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. Three justices dissented, arguing that the line of cases from Strauder v. West
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A. Criminal Defendants and State Action
As in Edmonson, the Court's holding in McCollum will turn on
the state action question. Here, the State will have to show that
the criminal defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory chal-
lenges constitutes state action.67
When a public official acts within the scope of his duties,
state action is clearly established.' Conversely, wholly private ac-
tivity taken for private purposes and without invoking the aid of
the State does not come within the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment.' These two categories of cases are relatively easy to
decide.
The more difficult cases, however, involve activity that appears
to be primarily private because the actor is a private citizen, such
as the defendant in McCollum, but may also be viewed as aided or
sanctioned by the State. In such cases, the Court must decide
whether or not the State's involvement with the private party is
sufficient to subject the activity to equal protection scrutiny. This
has not been an easy task; the Court has struggled to create an
appropriate standard by which to evaluate such cases.70
Virginia 100 U.S. 303 (1879) through Edmonson demonstrate that race is an improper
consideration for choosing jurors, regardless of the type of trial or party exercising the
peremptory challenge. Mcrollu, 405 S.E.2d at 689-93.
67 As in Edmourson, it is the excluded juror's equal protection rights that are at issue
in McCollum. There should be little question as to the prosecution's standing to assert
the excluded juror's rights under the Court's prior holdings in Powers and Edmonson. See
supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
68 See, eg., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 25 (1960) ("[E]very state offi-
cial . . . is bound by the Fourteenth . . . Amendment[].); RoNALU D. ROTUNDA rr AL,
TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, §16.1, at 157 (1986) ("When a legislature, executive
officer, or a court takes some official action against an individual, that action is subjected
to review under the Constitution, for the official act of any governmental agency is direct
governmental action and therefore subject to the restraints of the Constitution."). But cf.
Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981) (holding that a public defender is not a
state actor when performing traditional duties as an adversary of the state). Polk County is
discussed infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
69
Since the decision of this Court in the Civil Rights Cases, the principle has be-
come firmly embedded in our constitutional law that the action inhibited by the
first section of the Fourteenth Amendment is only such action as may fairly be
said to be that of the States. That Amendment erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful.
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (citation omitted).
70 "[T]o fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility
under the Equal Protection Clause is an 'impossible task' which 'This court has never at-
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In the area of equal protection jurisprudence, the three prin-
ciple decisions regarding private parties and state action are the
well-known cases of Shelley v. Kraemer,7' Burton v. Wilmington Park-
tempted.'" Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (quoting Kotch
v. Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 556 (1947)).
Indeed, the Court has formulated several tests for determining when primarily pri-
vate conduct is attributable to the state. These tests may be characterized as the "nexus"
test, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) ("[Tlhe inquiry must
be whether there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the challenged ac-
tion . . . so that the action . . . may be fairly treated as that of the State itself."); the
"state compulsion" test, Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 170 (1970) ("[A]
State is responsible for the discriminatory act of a private party when the State, by its
law, has compelled the act."); the "public function" test, Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946) (private parties performing public functions are state actors); the "symbiotic rela-
tionship" test, Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (see infra
note 72); and the "state enforcement" test, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (see
infra note 71). The Court has suggested that these various formulations may merely be
different ways of performing the same fact bound inquiry. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co.,
457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
71 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The facts of Shelley are well known. A white property owner
attempted to sell her property to the Shelleys, a black couple. The property was subject
to a restrictive covenant which prohibited occupancy by, or transfer to, people other than
whites. I& at 5. The Kraemers, who owned nearby property subject to these restrictions,
brought suit to prevent the sale to the Shelleys. The trial court found for the Shelleys,
holding that the covenant was ineffective because it had not been signed by all of the
property owners in the area, as intended by the parties. Id. at 6. The Supreme Court of
Missouri reversed, holding that the agreement was effective and that none of the
Shelleys' constitutional rights had been violated. 198 S.W.2d 679 (Mo. 1946). On appeal
to the United States Supreme Court, the Shelleys argued that the enforcement of the
covenant by the state courts violated their equal protection rights, deprived them of
property without due process of law, and denied them privileges and immunities guaran-
teed to citizens of the United States. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 7-8.
The primary issue for the Court was whether judicial enforcement of private agree-
ments was sufficient involvement by the state to constitute state action. Id. at 13. The
Court had faced challenges to similar agreements twice before, but did not reach the
merits of the cases. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (dismissed for lack of juris-
diction); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940) (lower court's inappropriate use of doc-
trine of res judicata violated petitioners' due process rights). The Shel y Court found both
of these cases inapplicable. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 8-9.
Turning to the issue in Shelley, the Court first made a lengthy review of cases that
held that action by a court is state action. Id. at 14-18. Interestingly, none of the approx-
imately 35 cases held that judicial enforcement of a private agreement is state action.
Rather, the cases broke down into two groups: procedurally unfair cases, such as Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (conviction obtained by coerced confession); and cases
of judicial enforcement of common law rules, such as Cantweell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (conviction of common law crime of breach of the peace violated right to
free exercise of religion). Shelley, 334 U.S. at 16-18.
The Court then examined the relationship between the parties to the suit and the
action of the state courts. The Court found that the Shelleys were willing purchasers and
that the owners were willing sellers. The only thing standing between the buyers and
sellers was "the active intervention of the state courts, supported by the full panoply of
state power . . . ." Id. at 19. Therefore, enforcement of the covenant violated the Equal
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ing Authority,72  and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis.73 As noted
Protection Clause. Id. at 20. Having found an equal protection violation, the Court did
not address the due process or privileges and immunities claims. Id. at 23.
The Shelley Court's holding represents the outer limits of the state action doctrine:
"State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, refers to exertions of state power in all forms." Id. at 20. Indeed, the Court noted
that the case was one "in which the States have made available . . . the full coercive
power of government ... ." Id. at 19. So stated, it appears that all cases brought before
the bench involve state action, and, therefore, are subject in every way to constitutional
limits. At least one commentator has argued this position. William R. Ming, Jr., Racial
Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amendment. The Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. CHI. L. REV.
203, 234-38 (1949).
Other commentators have tried to identify a limiting principle for Shelley. See, e.g.,
Louis Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 473
(1962) (Equal protection clause generally prohibits state enforcement of private discrimi-
nation, but there is a small area of liberty that the Constitution values more highly than
equal protection. In these cases, the state may enforce the discrimination.); Louis H.
Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L.
REV. 1, 13 (1959) (State cannot "assist[] a private person in seeing to it that others be-
have in a fashion which the state could not itself have ordained."). Professor Wechsler
has concluded that Shel/ey does not have a generally applicable principle. Herbert Wechs-
ler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (1959).
72 365 U.S. 715 (1961). The issue in Burton was whether the actions of a party rent-
ing space in a city-owned building constituted state action. The city of Wilmington had
created the Wilmington Parking Authority to provide parking facilities for the city. Id. at
717. To help defray the cost of the projects, the Authority leased space in its garages.
One of the lessees was the Eagle Coffee Shop. Id. at 719. In August 1958, Burton parked
his car in one of the Authority's garages and entered the Eagle Coffee Shop, where he
was denied service because he was black. Ld. at 720.
Burton filed a declaratory judgment action in the Delaware Court of Chancery
claiming that his Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. That court granted
his motion for summary judgment. 150 A.2d 197, 198 (Del. Ch. 1959). The Delaware
Supreme Court reversed, holding that Eagle's actions constituted purely private conduct.
157 A.2d 894 (Del. 1960). The court also denied a related state statutory claim. Id at
902.
On appeal, the Supreme Court first determined that the Delaware court's decision
was ultimately based on the finding of private action, not the state statutory claim. Ac-
cordingly, the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over the appeal. Burton, 365 U.S. at 721.
The Supreme Court's analysis began by stating "that private conduct abridging individual
rights does no violence to the Equal Protection Clause unless to some significant extent
the State in any of its manifestations has been found to have become involved in it." Id.
at 722. The Court recognized that it could not fashion a precise formula to evaluate the
extent of state involvement and that "[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance." Id. (The Court would continually return to this process. See, eg., Moose
Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 172 (1972).) In performing this "sifting and weigh-
ing," the Court noted that the building and land were publicly owned, that the building
was dedicated to public use, that upkeep and maintenance were paid for out of public
flnds, and that the state and Eagle derived mutual benefit from the arrangement. For
example, the state gained revenue from Eagle's rent payments, and Eagle's customers had
convenient parking in the city garage. Burton, 365 U.S. at 723-24. From these facts, the
Court concluded that
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above, the holding in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. is a synthesis of
the Court's earlier equal protection jurisprudence.74 Lugar is the
standard relied on in Edmonson.
Although the general principles enunciated in these cases are
applicable to state action questions involving private parties, they
are qualified when the alleged state actor is a criminal defense
attorney. In Polk County v. Dodson,7' the Court held that criminal
defense attorneys are not state actors when performing the tradi-
tional functions of defense counsel as an adversary of the state. If
exercising peremptory challenges is one of these functions, no
[t]he State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with
Eagle that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity,
which, on that account, cannot be considered to have been so "purely private"
as to fall without the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 725. The Court was careful to stress the impossibility of formulating a universal test
and limited its holding accordingly. Id. at 725-26.
73 407 U.S. 163 (1972). In this case, Irvis, a black man, was denied service in the
Moose Lodge dining room because of his race. Consequently, he brought a §1983 action
for injunctive relief against the Moose Lodge and the Pennsylvania Liquor Authority. He
alleged that state action existed because the Liquor Authority granted the Lodge a pri-
vate club license to sell alcoholic beverages. Id. at 164-65. The district court found that
state action existed because Pennsylvania law required private clubs to meet certain re-
quirements as to the physical premises, to file a list of members and employees, and to
keep extensive financial records. Irvis v. Scott, 318 F.Supp. 1246 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
After reviewing its jurisprudence in the state action/private conduct area, the Court
noted that it had never held that the action of a private individual or organization would
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the actor received a state benefit or
was subject to state regulation. Moose Lodg4,, 407 U.S. at 172-73. The Court stated that
"such a holding would utterly emasculate the distinction between private" and State con-
duct, because virtually every person and organization receives state benefits such as water,
electricity, and police protection. Id. at 173. Rather, "where the impetus for the discrimi-
nation is private, the State must have 'significantly involved itself with the invidious
discriminations'" for state action to exist. Id. (quoting Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369,
380 (1967)). The Court determined that although the state did subject private clubs to
detailed regulations, they were not the type to encourage or compel racial discrimination.
Id. at 176-77. Nor did they make the state a partner in the discriminatory conduct. Id. at
177. Accordingly, Moose Lodge's refusal to serve Irvis did not violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. Id. at 176-77. The Court also rejected Irvis' challenge to the Moose Lodge's
membership policies, holding that because he had never sought membership he did not
have standing to challenge the membership practices. Id. at 165-71.
The Court did, however, find that § 113.09 of the Pennsylvania Liquor Control
Board regulations violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This regulation required private
clubs to abide by their constitutions and bylaws. The purpose was to prevent places of
public accommodation from masquerading as private clubs. However, because blacks were
not eligible for membership under the Moose Lodge constitution, enforcement of §
113.09 would amount to state mandated discrimination. Accordingly, Irvis was entitled to
an injunction against enforcement of the regulation. Id. at 177-79.
74 See supra note 44.
75 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
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state action would exist when a criminal defendant uses the chal-
lenge. 76 Accordingly, whether or not there is state action in
Mcollum depends upon the application of both Lugar and Polk
County.
1. The Lugar Test
In light of Edmonson v. Leesvile Concrete Co., there is little
doubt that a criminal defendant's discriminatory use of perempto-
ry challenges satisfies the two-prong state action test of Lugar v.
Edmonson Oil Co. When this test is applied to McCollum's facts, a
finding of state action should follow.
The first prong of the Lugar test requires that the alleged
deprivation of a right "must be caused by the exercise of some
right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct im-
posed by the State or by a person for whom the State is responsi-
ble."" As in Edmonson, "It]here can be no question that the first
part of the Lugar inquiry is satisfied here."8 Peremptory chal-
lenges are statutorily or judicially created devices. Without the
government's sanction, through the legislature or the judiciary,
there would be no peremptory challenges.79
The second prong of the Lugar test requires that "the party
charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be
said to be a state actor."' Just as in Edmonson, more attention
must be given to this second prong. In Edmonson, the Court iden-
tified three factors that shed light on whether an individual is a
state actor under Lugar's second prong: "the extent to which the
actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits, whether the
76 Polk County was a § 1983 action brought by a criminal defendant against his court
appointed attorney. The defendant claimed that the public defender's failure to pursue
an appeal violated several of his constitutional rights. Because the accused was suing his
attorney, the Supreme Court necessarily focused on the attorney's status as a state actor.
When the prosecution claims that state action results from the action of a criminal de-
fense attorney on behalf of his client, a finding that the attorney is not a state actor will
necessarily apply to the defendant as well. Logically, the rationale of Polk County would
have to apply to pro se defendants as well. Pok County is discussed infra notes 87-103
and accompanying text.
77 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
78 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
79 "Peremptory challenges are permitted only when the government, by statute or
decisional law, deems it appropriate to allow parties to exclude a given number of per-
sons who otherwise would satisfy the requirements for service on the petit jury." Id.
80 Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
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actor is performing a traditional governmental function, and
whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the
incidents of governmental authority.""1
Clearly, the criminal defendant relies on the government's
assistance in exercising peremptory challenges; throughout every
stage of the jury selection process, the government is inextricably
involved through its oversight and enforcement.8 2
As to the second factor, the criminal defendant's use of pe-
remptory challenges assists the government in performing one of
its traditional functions. The Court in Edmonson noted that "[t]he
peremptory challenge is used in selecting an entity that is a quint-
essential governmental body, having no attributes of a private
actor."85s By using peremptory challenges to assist in choosing the
jury, the criminal defendant is performing a governmental func-
tion, delegated to it by the State.8
4
81 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083 (citations omitted).
82 In Edmonson, the Court stated:
As we have outlined here, a private party could not exercise its peremptory
challenges absent the overt, significant assistance of the court. The government
summons jurors, constrains their freedom of movement, and subjects them to
public scrutiny and examination. The party who exercises a challenge invokes
the formal authority of the court, which must discharge the prospective juror,
thus effecting the "final and practical denial" of the excluded individual's oppor-
tunity to serve on the petit jury.
Id. at 2084-85 (quoting Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322 (1880)).
83 Id. at 2085.
84 "If a government confers on a private body the power to choose the
government's employees or officials, the private body will be bound by the constitutional
mandate of race-neutrality." Id.
Justice O'Connor takes issue with the majority on this point. Justice O'Connor
claims that "[t]he Court errs . . . when it concludes that the exercise of a peremptory
challenge is a traditional government function." Id. at 2092 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
The problem with Justice O'Connor's conclusion is that it reads the majority opinion too
narrowly. The majority did not determine that exercising peremptory challenges is a
traditional government function; rather, it concluded that providing an impartial jury is a
traditional function of the government. Id. at 2085. Accordingly, actions taken through
the process chosen by the government to perform that function are state action.
Even if Justice O'Connor's position in Edmonson is accepted, her own dissent shows
that a different result would be reached in McCollum In West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42
(1988), the Court held that a private physician hired by the State to provide medical
care to prisoners was a state actor. (West is discussed infra notes 95-103 and accompany-
ing text.) In her dissent in Edmonson, Justice O'Connor distinguished West because in that
case "the State hired the doctor in order to fulfill the State's constitutional obligation to
attend to the necessary medical care of prison inmates. The doctor's relation to the
State, and the State's responsibility, went beyond mere performance of an important job."
Edmonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2093 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). In civil cases,
such as Edmonson, states do not have a constitutional obligation to provide a jury trial.
Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916). However, both the states
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Finally, as to the third factor, the injury caused when a crimi-
nal defendant exercises a peremptory challenge in a discriminatory
manner is certainly aggravated by the government's involvement.
The discrimination occurs in the State's courtroom in the pres-
ence of the State's judge. As a result, the discrimination may be
deemed to occur with the tacit approval of the State when the
judge, who oversees the administration of the challenges, eventual-
ly dismisses the challenged juror. Such "discrimination within the
courtroom raises serious questions as to the fairness of the pro-
ceedings conducted there."'
Thus, as in Edmonson, the second prong of the Lugar test is
satisfied by the facts of McCollum as well. The only fact that might
distinguish McCollum from Edmonson, in terms of the state action
analysis, is that in McCollum the criminal defendant is the direct
adversary of the state's prosecutor. In Polk County v. Dodson,86 the
Supreme Court held that criminal defense attorneys are not state
actors when performing the traditional functions of counsel as an
adversary of the state. The next section of this Note discusses Polk
County and applies it to McCollum.
2. Polk County
The issue in Polk County was whether a public defender, when
representing an indigent defendant, acts "under color of state
law, "17 as required to bring an action under section 1983. In Polk
County, a public defender was appointed to represent Dodson in
an appeal of a robbery conviction. After determining that the
and the federal government have an obligation to provide an impartial jury in a criminal
trial. See supra note 5. Accordingly, when the State utilizes private parties to fulfill its
constitutional obligation to provide an impartial jury in a criminal case, state action
would follow. Under Justice O'Connor's reading of Wes4 the same result should follow in
federal civil cases, where the government does have a constitutional obligation to provide
a jury trial. "In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved .. ." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
85 Edmonson, 111 S.Ct. at 2087. The Court continued: 'ro permit racial exclusion in
this official forum compounds the racial insult'inherent in judging a citizen by the color
of his or her skin." Id.
86 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
87 Although Polk County determined whether or not the public defender's actions
were under color of state law, as opposed to whether or not they constituted state ac-
tion, the Court has subsequently held that the two inquiries are the same, see, eg.,
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982), and has specifically extended Polk
County's reasoning to state action cases. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1009 n.20 (1982)
("[I]t is clear that the reasoning employed in Polk County is equally applicable to 'state
action' cases . . ").
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appeal was frivolous, the public defender moved for and was
granted permission to withdraw from the case. Dodson's complaint
claimed that the public defender's actions denied him due process
of law, deprived him of his right to counsel, and subjected him to
cruel and unusual punishment. The district court dismissed
Dodson's claims, holding that a public defender is obligated to be
loyal to his client; therefore, a public defender cannot be an
agent of the state.' The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reversed, holding that because the public defender was a creature
of the state, she was a state actor.8 9
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that a public defender,
like any other attorney, functions as an adversary of the State in a
criminal trial.' The only difference is that a public defender re-
ceives her payment from the State.9" Thus, the Court could not
find any color of state law in the public defender's adversarial
functions.
2
Despite this seemingly broad holding, the Court was careful to
emphasize that public defenders could, under appropriate circum-
stances, act under color of state law. The Court left open the
possibility that a public defender "would act under color of state
law while performing certain administrative and possibly investiga-
tive functions.' The Court's narrow holding in Polk County, was
"that a public defender does not act under color of state law
when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a
defendant in a criminal proceeding."
88 483 F.Supp. 347 (S.D. Iowa 1979).
89 628 F.2d 1104 (8th Cir. 1980).
90 Polk County, 454 U.S. at 320.
91 Id. at 318. However, the Court did not consider the employment relationship
irrelevant. Rather, it determined that public defenders are not subject to the same ad-
ministrative control as other state employees, id. at 321, and that the states have a consti-
tutional obligation to respect the professional independence of public defenders. Id. at
321-22. These factors differentiate public defenders from other state employees.
92 Id. at 320.
93 Id. at 325. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (public defender acts
under color of state law when making hiring and firing decisions for the state); Tower v.
Glover, 467 U.S. 914 (1984) (allegation that public defender conspired with state officials
to secure the conviction of defendant adequately states a claim of action under color of
state law).
94 Polk County, 454 U.S. at 325. See aso Tower, 467 U.S. at 920. ("[A]ppointed coun-
sel in a state criminal prosecution . . . does not act 'under color of' state law in the
normal course of conducting the defense.") (construing Polk County). Justice Blackmun
dissented in Polk County, arguing that the public defender's position as a state employee
and her exercise of power possessed by virtue of state law meant that her actions were
under color of state law as defined by United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941). Polk
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The Court's most extensive explanation of Polk County is
found in West v. Atkins.95 West, a prisoner in the state of North
Carolina, brought a section 1983 action against.Atkins, a private
doctor who provided medical care to prisoners under a contract
with the state, alleging that Atkins was "deliberately indifferent to
his serious medical needs," and that this indifference amounted to
cruel and unusual punishment.96
In affirming the district court's dismissal, the Fourth Circuit,
sitting en banc,9 7 concluded that
County, 454 U.S. at 329 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Recently, the Court found an adversarial situation outside of the criminal defense
attorney context that prohibited a finding of state action. In National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988), Jerry Tarkanian claimed that he was suspended
from his job as head basketball coach of the University of Nevada, Las Vegas ("UNLV")
'Running Rebels" in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights. After a
lengthy investigation by the NCAA, the UNLV basketball team was put on two year's
probation. The NCAA further ordered UNLV "to show cause why the NCAA should .not
impose further penalties unless UNLV severed all ties during the probation between its
intercollegiate athletic program and Tarkanian." Id. at 181.
The decisive issue was whether the activities of the NCAA constituted state action.
Id. at 181-82. The NCAA is an association of universities and colleges that establishes
rules and legislation governing intercollegiate athletics. Its policies are made by the mem-
ber institutions, many of which, including UNLV, are state schools. Id. at 183.
Tarkanian claimed, inter al/a, that the NCAA's activities constituted state action "be-
cause they resulted from a delegation of power by UNLV," id. at 195, and because
UNLV and the NCAA were 'joint participants' in state action." Id. at 196 n.16. The
Court rejected both of these arguments. The Court first noted that the university did not
delegate any power to the NCAA to take action against individual employees of the uni-
versity; the NCAA could only impose sanctions on the university itself. Id. at 195-96. Addi-
tionally, because the parties were in an adversarial relationship, UNLV's acquiescence in
the NCAA's decision could not be explained by a theory of delegated powers or joint
participation:
UNLV used its best efforts to retain its winning coach-a goal diametrically op-
posed to the NCAA's interest in ascertaining the truth of its investigators' re-
ports . . . . [T]he NCAA and UNLV acted much more like adversaries than like
partners engaged in a dispassionate search for the truth . . . Just as a state-
compensated public defender acts in a private capacity when he or she repre-
sents a private client in a conflict against the State, the NCAA is properly viewed
as a private actor at odds with the State when it represents the interest of its
entire membership in an investigation of one public university.
Id. at 196 (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320 (1981)). The Court also
found that "the state and private parties' relevant interests do not coincide . . . rather,
they have clashed throughout the investigation . . . . UNLV and the NCAA were antago-
nists, not joint participants, and the NCAA may not be deemed a state actor on this
ground." Id. n.16. Accordingly, the Nevada Supreme Court's holding in favor of
Tarkanian was reversed.. Id. at 199.
95 487 U.S. 42 (1988).
96 Id. at 45.
97 A panel of the Fourth Circuit originally vacated the district court opinion and
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the clear and practicable principle enunciated by the Supreme
Court [in Polk County] .. . is that a professional, when acting
within the bounds of traditional professional discretion and
judgment, does not act under color of state law, even
where ... the professional is a full-time employee of the
state.9 8
Holding that Dr. Atkins was acting under color of state law,
the Supreme Court criticized the Fourth Circuit's reading of Polk
County. In the Court's view, the Fourth Circuit
did not perceive the adversarial role the defense lawyer plays in
our criminal justice system as the decisive factor in the Polk
County decision. The court, instead, appears to have misread
Polk County as establishing the general principle that profession-
als do not act under color of state law when they act in their
professional capacities. 
9
The Polk County holding was not based on the fact that a public
defender is a professional. Rather, Polk County "turned on the par-
ticular professional obligation of the criminal defense attorney to be
an adversary of the State .... "' Accordingly, professionals are
not per se immune from section 1983 liability.10 1
As discussed above, under Lugar and Edmonson, a finding of
state action should result from the facts of McColluM. 10 2 This re-
sult, however, seems in tension with the proper understanding of
Polk County in light of West. that criminal defense attorneys are not
state actors when performing their traditional functions as an ad-
versary of the state.1 0 3 Accordingly, the proper inquiry is whether
a criminal defense attorney's use of peremptory challenges is one
of his traditional functions as an adversary of the state.
remanded to determine whether the record could support a finding of deliberate indif-
ference to a serious medical need. 799 F.2d 923 (1986).
98 815 F.2d 993, 995 (4th Cir. 1987) (en bane).
99 West, 487 U.S. at 51.
100 Id. at 52 (emphasis added). However, the Court did not consider the fact that a
person is a professional to be wholly irrelevant. "Where the issue is whether a private
party is engaged in activity that constitutes state action, it may be relevant that the chal-
lenged activity turned on judgments controlled by professional standards, where those
standards are not established by the State." Id. n.10.
101 Id. at 52. Applying this analysis to Atkins, the Court found that he was acting
under color of state law when performing his duties under the contract. These actions
were fairly attributable to the state. Id. at 54.
102 See supra part III.A.1.
103 See supra notes 87-101 and accompanying text.
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Several reasons have been articulated justifying peremptory
challenges. One of these is that the peremptory challenge gives
the accused a sense of fairness by allowing him to strike jurors
that he thinks will be biased against him, even if he does not have
a rational reason for this belief. °4 Another is that it allows the
accused to remove a potential juror who became hostile during
voir dire, but could not be removed for cause.105 A third is that
it allows removal of potential jurors who counsel thinks are biased
for a reason that would not suffice to remove them for cause.1 6
The peremptory also gives counsel an opportunity to correct a
judge's erroneous refusal to strike a juror for cause.107 All of
these rationales are various elements of the primary reason for
granting peremptory challenges: they are devices used to help
empanel an impartial jury. Indeed, one commentator claims that,
"[i]n the search for an impartial jury, the peremptory challenge is
one of the attorney's most valuable tools."0 ' This view is widely
shared.'09
The Supreme Court has also long recognized the importance
of peremptory challenges in securing an impartial jury. In Hayes v.
Missouri, the Court stated: "Experience has shown that one of the
most effective means to free the jury-box from men unfit to be
104 WILuAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353; GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 1, §
8.01, at 271; Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power", 27 STAN. L
REV. 545, 552 (1975).
105 BLACKSTONE, supra note 104, at *353; Babcock, supra note 104, at 554-55.
106 GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 1, § 8.01, at 271; Comment. Limiting the Peremptory
Challenge" Representation'of Groups on Petit Juries, 86 YALE L.J. 1715, 1718 (1977).
107 GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 1, § 8.01, at 271. In some situations, parties may
be required to use their peremptories for this purpose. In Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.
81 (1988), the trial judge erroneously refused to remove a juror for cause. As a result,
the defendant had to use one of his peremptory challenges. He was eventually sentenced
to death. Id. at 83. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights were not violated because he did not make a challenge for cause of any of the ju-
rors who were eventually seated. Id. Furthermore, the Court recognized that peremptory
challenges are not a constitutional right. Accordingly, the state can regulate their use. Id.
at 89. Under Oklahoma law, parties were expected to use peremptories to correct errone-
ous refusals to remove for cause. Id. at 89-91.
108 GOBERT & JORDAN, supra note 1, § 8.13, at 309.
109 See, eg., Babcock, supra note 104, at 550-51 ("Both [challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges] are part of the civil and criminal procedure of every jurisdic-
tion . . .for meeting the constitutional requirement that juries be impartial.") (footnotes
omitted); Gilda Mariani, Note, Peremptory Challenges-Divining Rod for a Sympathetic Jury?, 21
CATH. LAW. 56 (1975); Comment, supra note 106, at 1719 (Use of the two kinds of chal-
lenges "is expected to eliminate from the jury both extremes of bias and thus to result
in a tribunal as impartial as could be drawn from the available venire.").
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there is the exercise of the peremptory challenge."11° In Swain v.
Alabama, the Court claimed a dual function for the peremptory
challenge: "to eliminate extremes of partiality on both sides [and]
to assure the parties that the jurors . ..will decide on the basis of
the evidence placed before them, and not otherwise.""' And in
Edmonson, the Court explicitly recognized that the "sole purpose
[of peremptory challenges] is to permit litigants to assist the gov-
ernment in the selection of an impartial trier of fact.""
2
Given the purpose of the peremptory challenge, it is clear
that Polk County's reasoning does not apply to their use by crimi-
nal defendants and their attorneys. The Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees the accused a right to trial by an impartial jury; the govern-
ment has an obligation to provide such a jury. The purpose of
providing peremptory challenges is to assist the government in its
obligation to empanel an impartial jury. In creating its jury selec-
tion procedures and granting parties the right to peremptory chal-
lenges, the government is delegating the power to choose "a
quintessential governmental body,""' the jury. As noted by the
Court in Edmonson: "If a government confers on a private body
the power to choose the government's employees or officials, the
private body will be bound by the constitutional mandate of race-
neutrality. "114
Indeed, the Court has previously recognized that a public
defender is a state actor when making employment decisions for
the state. In Branti v. Finkel, s the Court held that a Democratic
public defender violated the First Amendment rights of assistant
public defenders when he fired them because they were Republi-
cans. Implicit in this holding is that the public defender was a
state actor. The Polk County Court cited Branti as an example of a
situation in which a public defender is a state actor.11 6 Because
peremptory challenges are part of the process by which the State
chooses its employees, their exercise is not a traditional function
of defense counsel as an adversary of the state.
110 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887).
111 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
112 Edmonson v. Leemille Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991).
113 Id. at 2085.
114 Id.
115 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
116 Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 324-25 (1981).
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Justice O'Connor's dissent in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.
misreads both Polk County and the majority opinion in Edmonson.
Justice O'Connor claims that the majority
wishes to limit the scope of [Polk County] to the actions of
public defenders in an adversarial relationship with the gov-
ernment.' 17 At a minimum then, the Court must concede
that [Polk County] stands for the proposition that a criminal de-
fense attorney is not a state actor when using peremptory
strikes on behalf of a client ....
This conclusion rests on Justice O'Connor's determination that the
use of a peremptory challenge is an adversarial function because
"parties use these strikes to further their own perceived interests,
not as an aid to the government's process of jury selection."" 9
The obvious implication of Justice O'Connor's conclusion is
that regardless of the reason for giving parties peremptory chal-
lenges, the parties use them to seat a jury slanted in their favor,
not an impartial one. Even if this is true,"' Justice O'Connor's
reliance on it is misplaced. The fact that defense counsel use
peremptory challenges to strike unsympathetic jurors does not
make their use the kind of traditional adversarial function envi-
sioned by Polk County. As examples of traditional adversarial func-
117 It is unclear why Justice O'Connor believes the majority sought to limit Polk Coun-
ty to public defenders. The second sentence of the quoted material implies that she
recognizes Polk County's applicability to both private and court appointed defense counsel.
Additionally, the majority does not give any indication that it would limit Polk County to
criminal defense attorneys, thereby making it inapplicable to cases such as National Colle-
giate Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179 (1988). See supra note 94.
118 Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2094.
119 Id. Justice O'Connor also notes that "a lawyer, when representing a private client,
cannot at the same time represent the government." Id. Although this is undoubtedly
true, it misses the point. The fact that the attorney cannot represent both the govern-
ment and his client does not mean that the two cannot be working for the same goal,
an impartial jury.
120 The Court has consistently refused to assume improper motives in the use of
peremptory challenges. In Swain v. Alabama the Court stated that "[t]he presumption in
any particular case must be that the prosecutor is using the State's challenges to obtain a
fair and impartial jury . . . ." Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 222 (1965). The Court
reaffirmed this point in Batson v. Kentucky, stating that it had "no reason to believe that
prosecutors will not fulfill their duty to exercise their challenges only for legitimate pur-
poses." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 n.22 (1986). In response to Justice Marshall's
call for abolishing peremptory challenges, id. at 103 (Marshall, J., concurring), the Court
claimed that the fear that prosecutors and judges would not perform their constitutional
duties did not justify abolishing a practice "which long has served the selection of an
impartial jury . . . ." Id. at 99 n.22. The same presumption of good faith must logically
be extended to the accused.
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tions, the Polk County Court noted that the defense attorney's job
is "to enter 'not guilty' pleas, move to suppress State's evidence,
object to evidence at trial, cross-examine State's witnesses, and
make closing arguments in behalf of defendants.""' Unlike par-
ticipation in the jury selection process, none of these tasks can be
considered functions of the State delegated to the parties; 22 they
go to the heart of our adversarial system. In contrast, peremptory
challenges could be eliminated without diminishing the adversarial
nature of our system in the least.
Because a criminal defense attorney's use of peremptory chal-
lenges is not a traditional function of the attorney as an adversary
of the State, but rather is a delegated function of government,
Polk County should not negate a finding of state action in
McCollum.12
3
121 Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 320 (1981).
122 For example, it is difficult to imagine an adversarial system in which the State is
obligated to object to its own evidence and has merely delegated the duty to a private
party.
123 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that a criminal defendant's gen-
der-based use of peremptory challenges violates the equal protection principles of the
Fifth Amendment. In United States v. DeGross, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 5645 (9th Cir.
Apr. 2, 1992) (en banc), the Ninth Circuit held that the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., "settled the issue" of whether equal
protection principles apply to a criminal defendant's use of peremptory challenges. Id. at
16. It held that "because the evils of discriminatory peremptory strikes result from the
misuse of peremptory challenges, regardless of which party strikes the venireperson, the
Fifth Amendment similarly limits a federal criminal defendant's peremptory strikes." Id.
As to the potential conflict because of the criminal defendant's role as an adversary
of the state, the court held:
We find this conflict to be conceptual only. The "state" which the defendant
opposes is not the same state actor whose powers he invokes in exercising a
peremptory challenge. When exercising a peremptory challenge, the defendant
has become a state actor for that limited purpose. If we saw no distinction be-
tween the state as the prosecutor and the state as the administrator of the sys-
tem, we would always see a conflict in criminal cases between the courts and the
prosecutor. But we do not see such a problem. While both are state actors, they
are distinct entities with distinct and different roles.
The defendant exercising a peremptory challenge invokes the authority of
the state as justice administrator. In so doing, the defendant becomes a state ac-
tor. But the defendant is still distinct from the state actor that compelled his
presence in court and which opposes him.
Id. at 22-23.
Thus, the court found that while the defendant's interests were at odds with the state as
represented by the prosecutor, they were the same as the state's in its role as administra-
tor of the trial. Id. at 22-24.
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B. Would Restricting the Use of Peremptory Challenges
Impede the Rights of the Accused?
McCollum's criminal context also arguably implicates a new set
of issues, not considered in Batson and Edmonson. Traditionally,
criminal defendants have been accorded heightened protection in
the American legal system, and any measures that might impede
the criminal defendant's ability to wage an effective defense have
been regarded suspiciously. 24 It might be argued that restricting
the criminal defendant's use of peremptory challenges would have
such an effect.
25
Historically, criminal defendants have been given the right to
exercise peremptory challenges for any reason they see fit. Indeed,
the peremptory challenge has long been regarded as a means to
insure that an accused is afforded a fair trial by jury. Blackstone
viewed the peremptory challenge as "a provision full of that ten-
derness and humanity to prisoners for which our English laws are
justly famous."126 The criminal defendant's right to peremptory
challenges has been protected since the First Congress.
127
The peremptory challenge, then, has come to be viewed by
many as crucial to the accused's defense. The importance of this
device, however, must be kept in perspective. While Congress
thought the peremptory challenge important enough to the crimi-
nal defendant to codify the right, the criminal defendant has
never possessed a constitutional right to exercise these challenges.
This point was emphasized by the Edmonson court, which noted:
"While we have recognized the value of peremptory challeng-
es, . . . particularly in the criminal context, there is no constitu-
tional obligation to allow them." 2 As a result, these challenges
124 "American public law is deliberately weighted in favor of defendants accused of
crime. It gives the accused very many assurances that he will be treated fairly." D.
FELLMAN, THE DEEENDANT's RiGHTs TODAY 3 (1976). See, e.g., Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012
(1988) (Iowa statute that allowed placement of a screen between child victim of sexual
assault and the accused violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, even
though the accused could see the child, because the child did not have to confront the
accused face-to-face while testiiying); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (Under
Florida law, a court could only appoint counsel to an indigent defendant in capital cases.
The Court held that this violates the accused's Sixth Amendment right to representation
by counsel.).
125 See, e.g., Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a Ciminal Defendant's Use of Peremptioy Chal-
lenges: On Symmetry and the Juty in a Ciminal Tria 102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 831-33 (1989).
126 BLACcSoNE, supra note 104, at *353.
127 See supra note 1.
128 Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991) (citation omit-
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are subject to a wide variety of regulation and are obviously sub-
ject to scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
It has been asserted that limiting a criminal defendant's use
of peremptory challenges might infringe upon the defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights, including the right to an impartial ju-
ry12 and the right to effective assistance of counsel."3  Neither
assertion appears very persuasive, however, especially in light of
the resultant violation of a juror's equal protection rights.
One of the notions underlying the Court's opinion in Batson
v. Kentucky was that one may not assume that a potential juror will
be partial to a member of his own race."'1 Thus, given the inval-
idity of the assumption that members of a *certain race are likely
to favor members of their race, restricting a defendant's right to
exercise peremptory challenges for solely racial reasons will not
affect the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.
In seeking to seat an impartial jury, the defendant can still strike a
juror for any reason or no reason at all, as long as the strike is
not racially-motivated. 
1 2
The other Sixth Amendment argument against limiting the
defendant's use of peremptory challenges is that requiring defense
counsel to provide a racially neutral explanation for some peremp-
tory challenges "would at times call for the disclosure of communi-
cations from the defendant to counsel .... "s Thus, it is ar-
gued, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assis-
tance of counsel would be violated since this would chill attorney-
client communications and could even undermine the client's
confidence in counsel.l"
ted). See also Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648,
663 (1987); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,
219 (1965); Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919).
129 See E. Vaughn Dunnigan, Note, Discrimination by the Defense: Peremptoy Chalnges
After Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L REv. 355, 358 (1988) ("[B]ecause of the constitu-
tional right to an impartial jury, defendants may have a more compelling interest in
using unfettered peremptory challenges than do prosecutors.").
130 See Goldwasser, supra note 125, at 831-33.
131 Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 ("[T]he Equal Protection Clause ... forbids the States to
strike black veniremen on the assumption that they will be biased in a particular case
simply because the defendant is black.").
132 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated: "The right [to utilize peremptory challeng-
es] is in the nature of a statutory privilege, variable in the number of challenges allowed,
which may be withheld altogether without impairing the constitutional guaranties of 'an
impartial jury' and a fair trial." Frazier v. United States, 335 U.S. 497, 505 n.11 (1948)
(quoting Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919)).
133 See Goldwasser, supra note 125, at 831-32.
134 Id. at 833.
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This also seems a tenuous argument. Effective assistance of
counsel certainly does not include the right to exclude jurors on
the basis of racial stereotypes. In addition, the likelihood that
requiring defense counsel to provide a racially neutral explanation
for the use of some peremptory challenges would in any way im-
pair defense counsel's representation of a client seems almost too
remote to consider. Counsel would not be required to divulge trial
strategies or even attorney-client communications, but merely to
provide a justifiable reason for striking a juror. Indeed, this ex-
planation need not even rise to the level that counsel is regularly
required to meet when seeking to challenge a juror for cause.135
Denying the ability to exercise peremptory challenges in a
discriminatory manner has minimal, if any, Sixth Amendment
implications. If the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are impli-
cated at all, this infringement is minor relative to the clear viola-
tion of the excluded juror's Fourteenth Amendment equal protec-
tion rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Georgia v. McCollum, the Supreme Court will resolve the last
major issue remaining in the line of cases that began with Swain
v. Alabama. While this case presents a rather unique state action
question, the Court should rule that the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits a criminal defendant from exercising peremptory chal-
lenges on the basis of race. The Court's previous decisions in
Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. and Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co.
provide the relevant framework for a finding of state action. 3 6
And, while Polk County v. Dodson initially appears to mandate a
135 See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. The Batson court explained: 'Though this requirement
imposes a limitation in some cases on the full peremptory character of the historic chal-
lenge, we emphasize that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying
exercise of a challenge for cause." Id.
136 See supra notes 63-87 and accompanying text.
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different conclusion, a proper reading of the narrow holding in
Polk County reveals otherwise.' 7 Finally, although it may be ar-
gued that such a holding in McCollum would infringe upon a crim-
inal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights, these arguments ulti-
mately prove tenuous, especially in light of the clear equal protec-
tion violation. 1 s
Michael N. Chesney
Gerard T. Gallagher
137 See supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
138 See supra Part III.B.
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